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It has been a decade since the outbreak of one of Asia’s most serious 
insurgencies, the conflict between Malay Muslims and the Thai state in 
Southern Thailand. Often ignored and unremarked upon by the 
international community, this conflict has left over 6,000 dead and 
countless others wounded. There is more at stake here than just stability 
in the south. In recent years, Thailand has seen a resurgence of ethno 
regionalist tensions across the country, most recently in the North and 
Northeast. Grasping the nettle by addressing the root causes of the 
southern insurgency will be crucial in turning back the tide of regional 
resentments and allowing Thais everywhere more political space to 
manage their own affairs without constant interference from Bangkok. 
The deep south must not become a model for a larger nationwide civil 
conflict. 
Sporadic attempts to settle the southern conflict peacefully have 
repeatedly failed. The most recent of these peace efforts was a 
Malaysian-sponsored dialogue process that began in February 2013. So 
far it has failed because neither the Thai government nor the militant 
groups have approached the talks with sufficient seriousness. 
Nevertheless, the Malaysian initiative marks considerable progress on 
previous, closed-door talks processes. Any new Thai government should 
persist with the Kuala Lumpur talks. For all their shortcomings, they offer 
the best prospects for reaching a political settlement. Both sides will, 
however, need to show greater commitment to such a settlement, 
including by introducing new structures and procedures that are more 
conducive to a serious negotiation. 
 






Southern Thailand is home to one of Asia’s most serious insurgencies; 
more than 6000 people have been killed in this contested region since 
2004.1 The conflict is primarily one between elements of the Malay-
Muslim population of the country’s southern border provinces, and the 
Thai state. To date, attempts by successive Bangkok governments to 
address the conflict through a mixture of repressive security measures 
and ill-conceived socio-economic development projects have yielded 
little result. This is an essentially political problem that cries out for a 
political solution – something that until recently the Thai authorities have 
been very reluctant to acknowledge. 
There is more at stake, however, than just the lives lost and disrupted in 
Southern Thailand. In recent years, Thailand has seen a resurgence of 
ethno-regionalist tensions across the country, most recently in the North 
and Northeast. Addressing the root causes of the southern insurgency 
will be crucial in turning back the tide of regional resentments. Potentially 
it would allow Thais everywhere more political space to manage their 
own affairs without constant interference from Bangkok. It is critical that 
the deep south not become a model for a larger nationwide civil conflict. 
In February 2013, however, the Yingluck Shinawatra government 
publicly endorsed a Malaysian-initiated dialogue process which is aimed 
at exploring moves towards a negotiated settlement of the southern 
conflict. Three meetings were held in Kuala Lumpur during the first half 
of 2013, but talks have not resumed since June. This paper reviews the 
background to the conflict and to the current dialogue process, the 
approaches adopted by the Thai government, militant groups and the 
Malaysian facilitators to the process, and the obstacles they have 
encountered to date. It argues that neither the Thai government nor the 
militant groups have approached the talks with sufficient seriousness; 
the Thais have been ill-prepared, while representatives of BRN, one of 
the main militant groups, have been hectoring and inflexible. 
Nevertheless, the Malaysian initiative represents progress on previous, 
closed-door talks processes, and could form the basis for more serious 
negotiations given greater commitment on all sides. 
HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
The Malay sultanate of Patani has long been a leading centre of Islamic 
learning in Southeast Asia, renowned for producing religious scholars – 
many of whom studied and worked in Cairo and other cities in the Middle 
East – and as a place where Islamic texts were printed and published. 
For centuries, Patani had a loose, tributary relationship with Siam, the 
forerunner of the modern Thai state. A thriving merchant community of 
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largely Chinese descent created a lively commercial and trading centre 
based around the port towns of Patani Bay.  
This all changed in 1909, when a treaty between Bangkok and the 
British formally absorbed Patani into what would become the modern 
nation state of Thailand. During the century that followed, the Thais have 
alternated between strategies of assimilation and accommodation, 
always with the aim of incorporating the Malay Muslim majority 
population of the area into an overarching Thai identity. But since Thai 
identity is predicated on the shibboleth of nation, religion and king, Malay 
Muslims have struggled to embrace ‘Thainess’. In short, many Malay 
Muslims cling to a different nation (imagined notions of an earlier Patani 
nation), a different religion (Islam rather than Buddhism), and a different 
king (a political identity to which the Chakri dynasty is completely 
extraneous).  
Today, the area historically understood as ‘Patani’ roughly corresponds 
to the three Thai provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, plus four 
districts of neighbouring Songkla. The total population of the three 
provinces is around 1.8 million, roughly 80 per cent of whom are Malay 
Muslims.2 At different junctures over the past century, armed insurgents 
have challenged the Thai state militarily. The most serious phase of 
insurgent violence lasted from the early 1960s to the early 1980s. During 
this period, an alphabet soup of different groups including PULO, BIPP, 
BRN (which later divided into different splinter groups) – staged shooting 
and bomb attacks, including an attempt to assassinate King Bhumibol at 
Yala railway station in September 1977. However, in the early 1980s the 
government of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond was able to broker a 
form of elite pact that reduced violence to fairly token levels for the next 
two decades. Key figures in the militant groups were either co-opted, 
assassinated or forced into exile – mainly to Malaysia or Europe.  
Shortly after Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister in early 2001, 
violence in Patani was once again on the rise. For political reasons, 
Thaksin set out to undermine key elements of the Prem era deal, 
disbanding the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (a 
government agency which had dispensed patronage and worked closely 
with Malay Muslim political religious leaders) and putting the police, 
rather than the army, in charge of security in the region (Thaksin had 
once been a police officer). Thaksin’s missteps coincided with a revival 
of insurgent activity, as a new generation of militants had become 
increasingly disillusioned with their former leaders. A bold attack on a 
Narathiwat army base in January 2004 saw four soldiers killed and a 
large cache of weapons seized, and marked a return to fully-fledged 
insurgency. Major incidents followed that year, most notably 
simultaneous attacks on 12 security checkpoints and bases in April, 
culminating in the bloody storming of the historic Kru-Ze mosque. This 
was followed in October by the Tak Bai incident, in which 78 Malay 




Muslim men were suffocated during their incarceration in military trucks. 
All of these incidents were huge propaganda victories for the insurgents.  
While nothing on the scale of Kru-Ze or Tak Bai has happened since, a 
relentless war of insurgent attrition has continued until the present day. 
Militants have made repeated changes of tactics, while the military has 
used a variety of responses, including mass arrests and attempts to 
remove suspected insurgents and sympathisers from their communities 
for periods of ‘training’ in army camps outside the region. None of these 
methods has achieved much success, and may indeed have hardened 
anti-state attitudes among Malay Muslims in the region. More recently, 
there has been an increasing focus by the militants on hard targets, 
especially members of the Thai security forces.  
Both political and military leaders have often framed the southern 
problem in terms of ‘development’ issues, channeling project resources 
into the region which have generally failed to benefit their intended 
recipients. In reality, there is no evidence that socio-economic 
grievances play much role in inspiring the insurgency. Another red 
herring has been the question of insurgency-related crime: the Thai 
authorities have long been eager to assert that much of the violence is 
driven by organised criminal activity, smuggling and the drug trade. But 
the evidence points overwhelmingly in the opposite direction. Crime in 
the region is underpinned by an ongoing violent conflict which is 
essentially political.3  
The structure of the militant movement remains unclear. There is no 
doubt that most of the violence is perpetrated by small cells of youths (or 
juwae, fighters) aged mainly between 18 and 25, who operate relatively 
independently after they are recruited and trained.4 The Thai security 
forces generally subscribe to the view that the juwae are working under 
the auspices of BRN-Coordinate, a spin-off of the old BRN; in their view, 
BRN-C is a hierarchical organisation with its own structure of provincial 
and district leadership that mirrors the Thai state. Others have argued 
that the current insurgent movement is a network rather than a 
hierarchy; linked together in a ‘liminal lattice’, individual cells constitute 
‘self-managed violence franchises’. If the insurgency is more network 
than hierarchy, and if at least some cells are not operating directly under 
a central command, defeating the militant movement is likely to prove 
extremely challenging.  
TOWARDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
The conflict is a challenge to the legitimacy of the Thai state, and like 
other comparable conflicts around the world – ranging from Aceh to 
Northern Ireland – is in urgent need of a political solution. That political 
solution remains to be defined, but is likely to involve some form of 
autonomy, ranging from elected provincial governors to a fully-fledged 
self-governing region.5 In the early years after the 2004 resurgence of 
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violence, the Bangkok government was largely in denial about the nature 
of the conflict, and unwilling seriously to contemplate moves towards 
solutions that involved some form of autonomy. More recently, a greater 
degree of realism has prevailed, and most key actors on the Thai side 
are privately well aware of the need for a political solution, though many 
of them continue to deny this in public. Thailand remains an extremely 
centralised nation with a French-style understanding of identity: all 
citizens are deemed to be Thai, and the existence of ethnic minorities is 
not constitutionally recognised. Accepting the need to decentralise 
power to a geographically concentrated ethnic and/or religious minority 
such as Malay Muslims would be a very radical step for Bangkok to take.  
A number of attempts to establish dialogue as a pathway towards a 
political solution have been made since 2005. These include moves 
supported by former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir (Langkawi 
2006), by former Indonesian vice-president Jusuf Kalla (Bogor 2008), 
and by various international organisations working in the peace-building 
field. The latter has included a Geneva-based organisation which worked 
closely with the 2008-2011 Abhisit Vejjajiva government, and a Finland-
based organisation that since 2009 has made persistent but 
unsuccessful attempts to insinuate its way into a dialogue process.6  
None of these initiatives led to significant breakthroughs, partly because 
they have tended to focus their efforts on particular elements within the 
Thai state – the National Security Council, the military, or the prime 
minister’s office – rather than engaging with a full range of state 
agencies.7 Given the diffuse nature of power within the Thai state and 
the competing networks operating within the government, any successful 
initiative would require broad-based support. Fragmented and polarised 
politics in Bangkok constitute a major obstacle to a political settlement. 
Since the military coup of September 2006, Thailand has been bitterly 
divided between supporters and opponents of former prime minister 
Thaksin. Pro- and anti-Thaksin forces have repeatedly staged massive 
street protests in Bangkok which paralysed the political system in 2006, 
2008, 2009, 2010, and most recently 2013-14.  
A similar problem is evident amongst the insurgents. Because of the 
diffuse nature of the insurgency and the lack of clearly identified groups 
and leaders controlling militant violence, it has not been easy to define 
who could or should represent the militants in any dialogue process. 
Previous processes have worked mainly with both non-insurgents – 
Malay Muslims with no direct ties to militant groups, but who may have 
relevant insights or access to back-channels – and former or exiled 
insurgents whose connections with the juwae are at best unproven, or at 
worst non-existent.  
The third major problem facing any dialogue process is the question of 
who is well-placed to facilitate, broker or mediate between the Thai 
authorities and the insurgents. Non-state actors may enjoy advantages 
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in such situations, but they lack the clout or the resources of 
governments. Governments from neighbouring countries may have 
much to contribute; but Malaysia and Indonesia are viewed as overly 
sympathetic towards the Muslim community in Patani.  
THE 2013 KUALA LUMPUR DIALOGUE PROCESS 
Since early in 2013, the Malaysian government has been brokering a 
new dialogue process which has gained support from the Thai 
government, and was publicly endorsed by the prime ministers of both 
Malaysia and Thailand. Thai prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra and her 
Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak took part in a public signing 
ceremony for a ‘general consensus document’, accompanied by 
considerable international fanfare, on 28 February 2013.8 
A large negotiating team from the Thai side was established. On the 
insurgent side is a group of representatives who claim to be from BRN, 
and were brought to the table by the Malaysian security services. The 
talks faced a serious challenge in June 2013 when the BRN side made a 
set of five wide-ranging demands that the Thai side struggled to address. 
A Ramadan ceasefire in July led initially to a decline in levels of violence, 
but was violated by some insurgents and ultimately sabotaged by the 
Thai Army. In September 2013, the insurgents sought to clarify their 
position by presenting the Thais with a document which aimed to 
convince them that the five demands were a negotiating position, not a 
pre-determined set of preconditions. Attempts to resume the dialogue 
meetings in late 2013 were thwarted by street protests in Bangkok, but 
the Malaysian side remained optimistic that talks could still be resumed.  
THE THAI TEAM 
Thailand’s ten-member team to the Kuala Lumpur talks9 was led by 
General Paradorn Pattanatabutr, secretary general to the National 
Security Council, General Niphat Thonglek, deputy permanent secretary 
of the Ministry of Defence, and Police Colonel Tawee Sodsong, 
secretary-general, Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center. 10  
The strength of the team lay in the range of different institutions covered 
by its members, including the NSC, SBPAC, the police and the interior 
ministry. But the weaknesses were also striking: there was no really 
high-ranking figure here, no minister or permanent secretary, and no top 
army commander. Analyst Don Pathan11 – the most vocal and persistent 
critic of the Kuala Lumpur process – has referred to the Thai negotiators 
as ‘Team Thaksin’, since most were regarded as loyal or at least 
sympathetic to former premier Thaksin, and had apparently been picked 
more on the basis of their political orientation than their formal standing. 
The absence of army top brass was especially significant. The military 
viewed the Thaksin-initiated dialogue process with some suspicion, and 
so maintained a degree of distance from it. In practice, most of the 




talking was done by Paradorn, Niphat and Tawee. Two of the Thai 
participants, Srisompob and Aziz, were supposed to be ‘civil society 
representatives’ who were brought in at the last minute and had no 
mandate to speak on behalf of the Thai government; their primary role 
appeared to be providing reassurance and supplementary perspectives. 
The Thais had no properly constituted secretariat, and the Malaysian 
facilitators were obliged to contact either Paradorn or Tawee personally 
to make all the arrangements for the meetings.   
The Thai team did not travel to Kuala Lumpur with a well-developed 
plan. Despite military talk of a ‘road map’, no such map had been agreed 
in advance by the Thai side, who quickly found themselves wrong-footed 
when the initial meeting on 28 March focused mainly on addressing 
demands raised by BRN. The Thai side never recovered the initiative, 
and in subsequent meetings BRN persisted in demanding that their five 
core principles be accepted as a basis for further talks. The Thais had no 
clear core principles. Thaksin had initiated the process and Yingluck had 
given it her approval by signing an agreement in Kuala Lumpur on 28 
February 2013. But once the talks were actually underway, there was 
little clear sense that the Thais had any plan, and there were no explicit 
signals from Bangkok that a political settlement – such as some form of 
autonomy – might be on the table. No prominent politicians made 
speeches to help prepare the Thai public for such an eventuality, and the 
militants naturally feared that the Thais were neither serious nor sincere 
about resolving the problem. The Thais persisted in talking about 
achieving a reduction in violence, but without making clear how this 
might come about.  
Overall, the Thai approach to the talks was characterised by 
amateurishness, lack of planning, and an absence of strategy. It would 
be easy to assume that this implied a lack of sincerity or commitment to 
the process, and this indeed might be true. But the fact is that most 
policy processes in Thailand have rather similar features, ranging from 
ASEAN security dialogues to the Yingluck government’s attempts to deal 
with hostile mass protests. If the Thais did not always seem to know 
what they were doing in relation to the Malaysian-brokered dialogue 
talks, that is at least partly because Thai officials often seem not to know 
exactly what they are doing. But given the importance of the talks and 
the number of lives at stake, their amateurishness was extremely 
disappointing. 
THE INSURGENT TEAM 
The team representing the insurgents was arguably even more 
problematic than the Thai side. The team was headed by Hassan Taib of 
the BRN, along with two representatives from the BRN foreign affairs 
division, one other senior BRN figure, one representative of BRN-Ulama 
(a splinter group of BRN), another from the BRN youth wing, Pemuda, 
and Lukman Bin Lima from one of the PULO factions.12 It was an open 
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secret that Hassan was not one of the core leaders of BRN, and during 
the meetings much of the talking was done by other members of his 
team. His role was that of liaison officer with the Malaysian government, 
and he had been involved in previous attempts by the Malaysians to 
broker peace deals dating back to the time of the coup era Surayud 
Chulanont government of 2006-07. When Thaksin wanted to encourage 
a peace process, and Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak was also 
eager to improve his domestic and international standing in the run-up to 
the general election of May 2013, Malaysia turned again to Hassan to 
set up a negotiating team. A more senior BRN figure who was asked to 
play the role declined to do so, and Hassan was then dragooned into 
taking part by the Malaysian special branch and security services. 
Hassan signed the agreement to take part in talks in his own name, 
rather than on behalf of BRN. He was not initially supported officially by 
the BRN’s ruling body, the Dewan Pimpinan Parti (DPP).13 He had to 
deal from the outset with opposition to the process from within the 
militant movement. One source argued that BRN could be divided into 
roughly three camps: one third supported the dialogue, one third strongly 
opposed it, and another third reserved judgement. 
Given their scepticism about the dialogue process, the BRN negotiators 
adopted a hard-line stance from the outset, seeking to set the agenda for 
the talks by strongly articulating their five demands. These comprised: 
• Recognition of BRN as representatives of the Patani people 
• Appointment of Malaysia as a mediator, not simply a facilitator 
• Involvement of ASEAN countries, OIC and NGOs in the process 
• Recognition of the existence and the sovereignty of the Patani Malay 
nation 
• Release of all detained Patani fighters from prison 
The BRN went public in that most modern of ways, issuing a video 
setting out their demands on YouTube in a deliberate attempt to bypass 
formal procedures and to seize the public relations initiative on the very 
eve of the second meeting.14  But this irritated both the Thai side and the 
Malaysian facilitators, and revealed that BRN lacked a clear 
understanding of how best to win friends or influence people. Compared 
with the Thai side, the BRN negotiators were much more focused on 
pushing forward a clear agenda. However, their notions of how to 
advance this agenda reflected years of isolation and exile. They seemed 
to be unable or unwilling to understand that a peace dialogue 
necessarily involves an extended process of exploring areas of possible 
agreement. 
These shortcomings reflected the fact that BRN lacks a proper political 
wing, a trusted cadre of non-combatants whose focus is on advancing 
the organisation’s objectives through non-military means. A further 
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problem with the focus on BRN – which parallels the Royal Thai Army’s 
fixation with BRN-C as the prime movers behind the insurgency – is that 
it may give the organisation excessive credit, prompting their over-blown 
demand to be viewed as the representative of the Patani people. If many 
of the juwae on the ground are either not directly connected with BRN, or 
indeed are not part of any formal insurgent group, the BRN focus of the 
talks may be a serious problem. All along, the Malaysians have argued 
that they would like to create a more inclusive process that brought 
together other militant groups including the various elements of PULO. 
MALAYSIAN FACILITATION 
The Malaysian-brokered dialogue initiative reflects the personal interest 
of Prime Minister Najib Razak, and is led by semi-retired senior official 
Datuk Seri Ahmad Zamzamin Hashim. Zamzamin was the former 
director of the research division of the prime minister’s office, and has an 
intelligence background.  It is clear that Malaysia has a vested interest in 
helping to resolve a violent conflict taking place on its northern border; 
for one thing, it is an open secret that tens or hundreds of thousands of 
Malay Muslims in border areas illegally hold dual Thai and Malaysian 
nationality. Many current or former leaders of the Patani militant groups 
live in Malaysia, most of them under the watchful eye of the Malaysian 
special branch and intelligence services. This is the reason why 
Zamzamin’s team was able to assemble a group of BRN negotiators to 
join the peace process. Zamzamin has strong support from eight senior 
officials in the National Security Council (an agency concerned primarily 
with internal security) who constitute a secretariat for the process – a 
much more robust operation than the ad hoc arrangements on the Thai 
side.  
A lesson from other comparable conflicts is that neighbouring countries 
that are historically implicated need to be brought on board in order for 
violence to be reduced. The role of the Irish Republic in the Northern 
Ireland conflict is an obvious example. The larger question is whether a 
historically implicated neighbour is capable of brokering a deal, as 
opposed to supporting one.  Many Patani militant leaders are sceptical 
about Malaysia’s role as self-proclaimed honest broker. They have a 
love-hate relationship with the Malaysian state, which has provided them 
with a safe haven but has closely monitored and controlled their 
activities, sometimes for decades. Likewise, the Thai state harbours an 
abiding mistrust of Malaysian intentions in the region, fearing either that 
the country would like to ‘take back’ Patani into its own territory, or to 
sponsor the separatist aspirations of its kith and kin across the Thai 
border. While in reality the current Malaysian government would be 
strongly opposed to incorporating Patani – which would become a 
stronghold for the PAS opposition party – disabusing Thai military and 
government officials of their anti-Malaysian views is a struggle.  




The Malaysian side persistently called for their status to be upgraded 
from that of facilitator to that of mediator and core participant. In reality, 
the Malaysian side was already acting as far more than a mediator. This 
became evident in September 2013, when Zamzamin travelled to 
Bangkok from Kuala Lumpur to ‘explain’ the BRN’s five demands to 
General Paradorn. The Malaysian delegation (which did not include any 
militant representatives) provided a 38-page document and 
accompanying PowerPoint presentation elaborating on the demands, 
explaining how they were compatible with the Thai constitution, and 
offering concessions (a point-by-point ‘offer in return’) from BRN if the 
Thais were to accept the principles they contained. There was 
widespread suspicion that the detailed document had been produced 
mainly by Zamzamin’s office. Both the demands themselves and the 
way they were elaborated appeared to reflect the concerns of the 
Malaysian side. At the core of the document was the demand that 
Malaysia be upgraded to mediator, as part of a process of upgrading the 
talks from a peace dialogue to a peace negotiation. This was partly 
justified by reference to the third demand – Malaysia’s status as a 
member of both ASEAN and the OIC.  
After the problems surrounding the 2013 Ramadan ceasefire, Malaysia 
went on something of a diplomatic offensive to try to regain the initiative 
and maintain the momentum of the talks. After the September 
PowerPoint trip, Zamzamin pursued a variety of other initiatives in the 
absence of further formal meetings of the dialogue partners. These 
included reaching out to different factions of PULO, who signed a 
November agreement to take part in future talks, visiting Indonesia to 
talk to representatives of other militant factions, and giving talks and 
press conferences in Thailand to drum up more support for the process 
in February 2014. However, none of these efforts succeeded in 
restarting face-to-face talks. The high-profile progress of the Mindanao 
peace talks – in which Malaysia is also involved – has increased 
pressure on Zamzamin to deliver the goods in Southern Thailand, 
though in reality this is not a fair comparison given the much longer 
investment of time in the Philippine process.15  
THE RAMADAN PEACE INITIATIVE  
The Malaysians were nothing if not ambitious about the talks. Speaking 
in Pattani on 28 February 2014, Zamzamin admitted that he had been 
hoping to see a cessation of hostilities within 2015. The first stage 
towards this goal had been the Ramadan initiative; in effect a 40-day 
ceasefire starting on 10 July 2013. Billed as a confidence-building 
measure, the planned ceasefire was a bold move which the facilitators 
hoped would create an inexorable momentum towards peace. The 
problem was the proposed ceasefire came after just three meetings 
between the two sides, and it was far from clear that either side could 
deliver. Elements in the Thai military were not yet on board with the 




process, while the BRN representatives at the Kuala Lumpur talks had 
only limited influence over the juwae.  
In the event, there was a significant drop in violence during the first week 
of Ramadan, and according to Deep South Watch, over the entire month 
there was less violence than in any of the previous nine years.16 
However, troubling incidents from the early days of the ceasefire soon 
undermined its credibility. There were continuing attacks by militants, 
while the Thai security forces failed to adhere to the detailed seven-page 
guidelines agreed in Kuala Lumpur, under which the military were 
supposed to keep a low profile and scale back their presence in 
sensitive areas. On 19 July, an army unit undertook an unusually bold 
raid: a platoon of men trekked for ten hours into the jungle to attack an 
insurgent camp in Narathiwat.17 This raid looked suspiciously like a 
deliberate attempt by elements in the Thai security forces to sabotage 
the talks.   
In the first week of August, BRN announced its withdrawal from the 
ceasefire, and suspended its involvement in the talks – announced in yet 
another YouTube video.18 This video was far more aggressive than 
previous ones, featuring armed masked men rather than identifiable 
members of the dialogue team – a clear sign of hard-line dissatisfaction. 
There was an immediate and sharp escalation in attacks. These 
included the killing of Yacob Raimanee, the imam of Pattani Central 
Mosque, who had been a prominent supporter of the dialogue process.  
The subsequent unravelling of the ceasefire dealt a serious blow to 
credibility of the Kuala Lumpur initiative. But the ceasefire did 
demonstrate that the BRN negotiators apparently had the capacity to 
reduce violence, especially in the central areas of Pattani and Yala; they 
had less control over peripheral areas of the southern border region 
where other groups were stronger.19 The clearest lesson of the 
Ramadan initiative, however, was the limited degree of control that the 
NSC and SBPAC could exert over the Thai security forces, especially 
the Army. Any future ceasefire will need more robust enforcement and 
much better monitoring. 
In the wake of the troubled Ramadan initiative, BRN became 
increasingly adamant that the Thais needed to demonstrate their 
sincerity by signing up to the five demands, even calling for these points 
to be ratified by the Thai parliament as a basis for continuing 
negotiations. Such a call illustrated the extent to which BRN was willing 
to overplay its hand, since parliamentary endorsement at such an early 
stage was not at all realistic. But the Thais were also sluggish in 
responding to BRN, and it was not until 25 October that Paradorn issued 
a letter accepting the further discussion of the demands. The failure of 
the Thais to respond more promptly and positively increased the 
pressures on Hassan, who referred to himself in a short YouTube video 
posted on 1 December 2013 as a ‘former’ BRN delegate – which was 
widely construed as suggesting he had stepped down.20 He proceeded 




to disappear from public view, though apparently privately assuring 
people around him that he had not formally ended his participation and 
was willing to continue fronting the negotiations. But the inability of the 
Malaysians either to produce Hassan or to name a replacement had the 
effect of further undermining popular faith in the peace process.  
Following a disastrous attempt to pass a wide-ranging amnesty bill in 
November 2013, the Yingluck government found itself facing mass 
protests from opposition groups in the capital, and was forced to dissolve 
parliament in December. But the parliamentary dissolution did nothing to 
assuage her opponents, who convened a set of parallel mass rallies 
aimed at a ‘Bangkok Shutdown’ on 13 January 2014. The snap election 
held on 2 February was boycotted by the opposition Democrat Party and 
did little to resolve the situation. Unable to function with anything 
resembling normality, the caretaker Yingluck government lost interest in 
dealing with the southern conflict. Key officials such as Paradorn were 
focused on the national security of the ruling administration, rather than 
furthering peace talks with BRN. Following a legal decision concerning 
the circumstances of his appointment, Paradorn himself faced probable 
removal from his position as head of the NSC in April 2014 – potentially 
leaving the Thai delegation with no chair. 
EVALUATING THE TALKS PROCESS 
The Malaysian-brokered dialogue process is by far the most credible of 
the various processes so far seen in relation to the southern conflict. 
Nevertheless, the process faces a host of challenges.21 On the Thai 
side, the dialogue team struggles domestically with the perception that 
they are ‘Team Thaksin’, representatives of one major political faction, 
with little support or buy-in from the opposition Democrats or from the 
military. The team has also been characterised by lack of preparation, by 
internal tensions – the key players on the team do not enjoy especially 
warm relations – and lack of administrative support. Above all, however, 
the Thai side has suffered from a lack of strong national backing. There 
has been little evidence that the Yingluck government is deeply 
committed to the pursuit of a political solution to the southern conflict. 
On the militant side, the BRN team has struggled to manage its relations 
both with the Malaysians and with the diverse and fractious militant 
movement more broadly. Its claims to represent the entire Patani Malay 
people are quite tendentious and its negotiating strategies have been 
high-handed and inept. Nevertheless, a source close to the militant 
groups has argued that there is a still a basis for optimism about future 
progress.22 He suggested that the talks were neither a failure nor dead, 
but merely suspended. 
 
The Malaysian-brokered 
dialogue process is by 
far the most credible of 
the various processes so 
far seen in relation to the 
southern conflict. 




The strongest criticisms of the Malaysian process have come from Yala-
based analyst Don Pathan, who has described the talks as ‘somewhere 
between a hoax and a big leap of faith’.23 At the core of his criticisms lies 
his belief that the BRN team is out of touch with most of the young 
fighters on the ground, and has no capacity to deliver a settlement.24  
Pathan regards the demands issued by BRN simply as attempts to test 
the waters, rather than as real statements of their negotiating position. 
He is equally critical of the Thai side, given their pro-Thaksin alignment 
and lack of support from senior figures in the Army.  
Malaysia has been struggling to counter criticism from both the 
insurgents and the Thai side that it has an agenda of advancing its own 
interests, and is in some ways not well placed to play the role of honest 
broker. But the current process remains the only serious game in town, 
and has been widely supported in the deep south, especially by ordinary 
Malay Muslims. For the first time since Thaksin’s 2005 announcement 
that he was setting up the National Reconciliation Commission to 
investigate the causes of the southern conflict, people in the region feel 
that they are receiving some serious attention from Bangkok. Various 
initiatives among civil society groups in the region reflect grassroots 
attempts to promote the peace process from below, and these are 
worthy of greater support. 
Ultimately, the peace process is not going to succeed without the real 
commitment of both sides to a political outcome. But even with that 
commitment all sides will also need to address some structural and 
procedural problems that will continue to undermine any negotiating 
process. 
The Thai side would need to revamp its team, reducing the size of the 
delegation and including more senior military figures from the inner 
circles of the Army’s high command. In order to support the process 
more effectively, the Thai government would have to establish a full-time 
secretariat, based probably in the prime minister’s office, to support the 
process, and second a core group of highly capable officials to this 
secretariat. The process would ideally have ministerial oversight or even 
direct participation, and the prime minister would need to give regular 
briefings to the Cabinet, parliament and the public on the progress of 
talks. Political leadership at the highest level would have to be used to 
prepare the wider Thai public, both in the deep south and around the 
country, for the prospect of a political settlement. Agreement would need 
to be sought with the Democrat Party and other opposition forces that 
achieving peace in the south could become a bipartisan goal, and that 
any successor government to the Yingluck administration would 
continue to support the current dialogue process (albeit possibly with a 
revised format). 
The militants would need to develop an explicit ‘political wing’ to 
represent them in any dialogue process. This would also need to include 
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a secretariat and a team of advisers who could prepare policy options 
and develop responses to issues raised during the talks. A broader 
group of militant groups would also be represented in the talks to 
achieve greater buy-in. The BRN negotiators would need to adopt a 
more pragmatic approach to the dialogue process rather than engaging 
in constant brinkmanship. 
The Malaysians would need to play down their agenda of formalising 
their role as mediators, since in practice they are already performing this 
function. Harping on this issue only serves to arouse suspicion on both 
the Thai and militant sides. If they were content to allow the dialogue 
process to evolve more organically, this would be broadly welcomed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Yingluck government is facing a range of political and judicial 
pressures which may well force it from office in the weeks and months 
ahead. There is a real possibility that a more conservative administration 
might soon assume power, one much closer to the Democrat Party and 
the military. Any such administration would be likely to face continuing 
protests and challenges to its legitimacy, and hence have limited 
capacity to focus on the southern conflict. But in the medium term, a new 
government of this complexion would be likely to look askance at the 
current ‘Thaksin-initiated’ peace process and might be tempted to 
abandon it on partisan political grounds. It would be an enormous pity if 
the gains made over the past year were to be squandered by an 
incoming Thai administration that simply disbanded the Kuala Lumpur 
initiative. In short, given the number of lives that have been lost in this 
terrible insurgency, any peace process is better than no peace process. 
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